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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant, Albert Flora, Jr., the former Chief Public 
Defender for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, challenges the 
order of the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania dismissing his First Amendment 
retaliation claims against the County and its manager, Roger 
Lawton.  Because the District Court applied an incorrect 
standard in determining whether the facts alleged in the 
complaint set forth a claim for relief, and because, under the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lane v. Franks, __ U.S. 
____, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014), Flora pled facts sufficient to 
allege that he spoke as a citizen, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order and remand for further proceedings.  
 
I.  Background1 
 
 Flora worked for the Luzerne County Office of the 
Public Defender from 1980 until 2013.  He became the First 
Assistant Defender in 1990 and the Acting Chief Public 
Defender in March 2010.  Three months later, the Luzerne 
County Board of Commissioners (“the Commissioners”) 
appointed him as the Chief Public Defender.  He also 
maintained a private criminal defense practice during his 
tenure with the Public Defender’s Office.   
                                              
 1 Because we are reviewing the grant of a motion to 
dismiss, we recount the facts as alleged by the non-movant, 
Flora, accepting them as true and construing them in the light 
most favorable to him.  Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock 
Trust v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 178, 182 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  
 4 
 
 
 The Public Defender’s Office is charged with 
providing representation to indigent criminal defendants in 17 
magisterial districts, the Luzerne County Court of Common 
Pleas, and the appellate courts of Pennsylvania.  It also 
provides representation in state and county parole, probation, 
and civil commitment proceedings.  When Flora became the 
Chief Public Defender, the office was “plagued with 
problems as a result of years of insufficient funding.”  
(Appellant’s Br. at 3; see also App. at 11.)  His predecessor 
had tried to secure additional funding from Luzerne County 
by submitting weekly reports to the Commissioners that 
detailed the excessive caseloads and staffing deficiencies.  To 
improve the quality of representation for juveniles, Flora 
sought and obtained grant funding from the Pennsylvania 
Commission on Crime and Delinquency and the Luzerne-
Wyoming Counties Mental Health Program.  He was not, 
however, able to obtain additional money to address the 
funding crisis as it pertained to adult offenders.  Flora 
provided the County, the Commissioners, and Lawton with a 
report in June 2010 that detailed funding inadequacies and 
stated that the current level of resources did not allow the 
Public Defender’s Office to provide constitutionally adequate 
representation to its clients.  The County was unresponsive to 
Flora’s concerns, so he restricted the types of clients that the 
Office would represent, refusing representation to those who 
were not faced with a period of incarceration if convicted.   
 
 Flora continued battling the County on funding, 
submitting his 2012 budget “under protest” and stating that 
“[c]urrent staffing levels and existing caseloads[] prevent this 
office from providing the level of representation required by 
ethical standards and by Federal and State Constitutions ... .  
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[T]he office is ethically required to withdraw from existing 
cases or refuse new cases.”  (App. at 47.)  By April 2012, 
insufficient funding coupled with a hiring freeze and several 
attorney resignations meant that the resource issue had 
reached a critical stage.2  Flora thus decided to initiate a class 
action lawsuit for the benefit of indigent criminal defendants.  
With three clients of the Public Defender’s Office as the 
named plaintiffs in the suit, he filed a complaint in the 
Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas on April 10, 2012, 
and petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the County 
to provide adequate funding, office space, and attorney 
staffing.  That same day, he filed a federal court complaint 
and a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking an order to 
prevent the County from firing him for his actions.  Flora v. 
Luzerne Cnty., No. 12-665 (M.D. Pa. filed Apr. 10, 2012).  
Rather than litigate the federal claim, the parties entered into 
a stipulation allowing Flora to remain Chief Public Defender.   
 
 On June 15, 2012, the state court granted Flora’s 
petition for mandamus.  It ordered the County to provide 
adequate funding and staffing to the Public Defender’s 
Office,3 and it further ordered the parties into mediation and 
                                              
 2 Flora’s complaint suggests that the attorneys resigned 
due to unreasonable workloads, inadequate funding, and the 
ethical quandaries those issues created.   
  
 3 The County appears to have confined its entire 
defense of the state court funding action to arguing that the 
statute requiring the County to provide a public defender 
mandated only that the County have an individual titled 
“Public Defender” and not that it staff the public defender’s 
office or provide it with any funding.   
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prohibited the Public Defender’s Office from refusing 
representation to any indigent defendants.  On December 19, 
2012, while the parties were in mediation, the County Council 
approved an amendment to the Public Defender’s budget to 
add a full-time Chief Public Defender position and to 
maintain a part-time Assistant Public Defender.4  Three 
months later, Flora and other candidates interviewed with a 
panel of representatives from the County government for the 
Chief Public Defender position, with Flora and two others 
receiving the panel’s recommendation for further 
consideration.   
 
 Meanwhile, the funding litigation Flora had instituted 
in state court was unfolding amidst the fallout from the “Kids 
for Cash” scandal.  Between 2003 and 2008, approximately 
50% of juvenile offenders in Luzerne County appeared in 
court without the benefit of counsel – about ten times the state 
average.  Virtually all were adjudicated delinquent.   
Eventually, federal investigators uncovered a scheme in 
which two Luzerne County Common Pleas judges had been 
accepting kickbacks from for-profit juvenile detention 
facilities in exchange for sending unrepresented juvenile 
defendants to those facilities.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
                                                                                                     
 
 4 After creating the new full-time public defender 
position, the County petitioned the state court to end the 
mediation and also answered the federal complaint that Flora 
had filed, alleging that it was moot.  Flora responded by 
voluntarily dismissing his federal complaint.  Flora v. 
Luzerne Cnty., No. 12-665 (M.D. Pa. dismissed Mar. 11, 
2013).    
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Court responded to these revelations by appointing a Special 
Master – Senior Judge Arthur Grim of the Bucks County 
Court of Common Pleas – to recommend ameliorative 
measures.  Based on Judge Grim’s report and 
recommendation, the Supreme Court in 2009 ordered the 
vacatur and expungement of thousands of delinquency 
adjudications and consent decrees.  Notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court’s order, Flora alleges that, in early 2013, 
during a routine meeting with court administrative staff, he 
learned that over 3,000 of the adjudications and decrees had 
not yet been expunged.  He then brought that failure to the 
attention of the County, the District Attorney for the County, 
the Administrator of the Court of Common Pleas, the public 
interest law firm that represented the juveniles in the 
expungement proceedings, and Judge Grim.  Lawton, who, as 
previously noted, was the County Manager, was angry that 
Flora had reported the expungement issue to Judge Grim, 
even though Flora explained that, “as an officer of the Court,” 
he felt compelled to do so.   
 
 Lawton interviewed Flora for the Chief Public 
Defender position in March 2013, but ultimately 
recommended – and the Commissioners approved – a 
different attorney, Steven Greenwald.  As the County hired 
Greenwald, one Commissioner informed the media that Flora 
was a “controversial” candidate because of the funding 
lawsuit.  Flora had been scheduled to stay in office until 
April 29, 2013, but on April 17, 2013, Lawton informed him 
that he was relieved of all duties as Chief Public Defender.   
 
 A few days later, Flora filed the present action, 
alleging that he had been terminated from his position as 
Chief Public Defender in retaliation for his efforts to secure 
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funding for the Office of the Public Defender and for 
reporting the County’s noncompliance with the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s expungement order.  He asserted claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a theory of First 
Amendment retaliation,5 and he also included in his 
                                              
 5  Section 1983 is the vehicle public employees use to 
bring claims that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
have been violated.  Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 
503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).  The County and Lawton argue for 
the first time on appeal that Flora’s complaint did not contain 
a § 1983 First Amendment claim based on his reporting about 
the juvenile expungements.  While it is true that Count I of 
the complaint describes only the filing of the state court 
action, the complaint makes numerous references to the 
expungement issue as a factor in Flora’s dismissal, and Count 
I of the complaint contains an incorporation-by-reference 
paragraph which sweeps in those earlier allegations regarding 
the expungement issue.  Moreover, in their motion to dismiss, 
the County and Lawton acknowledged the existence of 
Flora’s claim with respect to the expungement report, and 
they expressly argued that Flora could not state a First 
Amendment retaliation claim based on that issue.  In short, 
that claim was contained, and understood by all to be 
contained, in Flora’s complaint.  See Rosenthal v. Rizzo, 555 
F.2d 390, 392 n.2 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he amended complaint 
expressly declared that Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by 
reference herein paragraphs 1-27, and 29-36 ... . Thus, the 
crucial paragraph 10 was realleged.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted);  see also Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney 
Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (“These allegations, 
which are incorporated by reference in every count of the 
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complaint state-law wrongful termination and Whistleblower 
Act claims.  He sought an order restoring him to the Chief 
Public Defender position but did not seek monetary damages.  
 
 The District Court dismissed Flora’s complaint, 
concluding that he had failed to state a First Amendment 
claim because the filing of the state court action and the 
reporting of unfinished expungements “related to” his official 
duties as Chief Public Defender and thus, under Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), were not protected by the 
First Amendment.  (App. at 3-31.)  After dismissing Flora’s 
only federal claim, the District Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. This 
appeal followed.6  
 
                                                                                                     
complaint, readily satisfy the misrepresentation requirement 
… .”). 
 
 6 The District Court dismissed the state law claims 
without prejudice to Flora’s refiling them in state court, 
which Flora did on on April 9, 2014.  Flora v. Luzerne Cnty., 
No. 2014-4731 (Ct. C.P. Luzerne Cnty. filed Apr. 9, 2014).  
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II.  Discussion7 
 
 Public employees do not renounce their First 
Amendment rights upon employment; however, “the 
government’s countervailing interest in controlling the 
operation of its workplaces” limits the First Amendment’s 
ordinarily broad protections.  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).   
 
 To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a 
public employee must show that his speech is protected by 
the First Amendment and that the speech was a substantial or 
motivating factor in what is alleged to be the employer’s 
retaliatory action.  See Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 
(3d Cir. 2009).  If the employee establishes both of those 
predicates, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it 
would have taken the same action even if the speech had not 
occurred.  Id.  In this case, the second predicate was in effect 
conceded for purposes of the motion to dismiss,8 so the only 
                                              
 7 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo a dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6).  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 
(3d Cir. 2008).   
 
 8 The County and Lawton failed to include any 
argument on their motivations in their 12(b)(6) motion, and 
thus they conceded the issue for the purposes of that motion 
and this appeal.  Delaware Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 
410, 416 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (June 14, 2006) 
(“Although [the plaintiff] now contends that it did not 
concede the argument … , it does not, and cannot, argue that 
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issue before us is whether Flora’s speech was protected by the 
First Amendment.   
 
 A public employee’s statement is protected by the First 
Amendment when: “(1) in making it, the employee spoke as a 
citizen, (2) the statement involved a matter of public concern, 
and (3) the government employer did not have ‘an adequate 
justification for treating the employee differently from any 
other member of the general public’ as a result of the 
statement he made.”  Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 
225, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 
418).  At present, the parties dispute only whether Flora was 
speaking as a citizen or as an employee of the Public 
Defender’s Office when he spoke out through the funding 
lawsuit and through his report about incomplete 
expungements.  In other words, the survival of the case comes 
down to whether that speech was within Flora’s job duties.  
See Lane, 134 S.Ct. at 2379 (noting that the key question in 
                                                                                                     
it raised the issue before the District Court.  Therefore, the 
issue is waived.” (internal citation omitted)).  Insofar as they 
attempted to introduce in their factual background portion of 
their briefing before the District Court a dispute about their 
motivations in refusing to hire Flora, the District Court 
properly rejected their efforts as raising matters outside the 
pleadings and therefore being inappropriate in a motion to 
dismiss.  (App. at 5 n.1 (“The court notes that the defendants 
have relied on materials outside of the pleadings in support of 
the factual background set forth in their motion to dismiss.  In 
accordance with the standard for considering a motion to 
dismiss, the court has not considered the outside materials in 
deciding the defendants’ pending motion.”).)  
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the citizen speech analysis is “whether the speech at issue is 
itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties.”).  
 
 A. Factual Dispute 
 
 “‘Whether a particular incident of speech is made 
within a particular plaintiff’s job duties is a mixed question of 
fact and law.’”  Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., ___ F.3d 
____, No. 13-3868, 2014 WL 6600421, at *5 (3d Cir. Nov. 
21, 2014) (brackets omitted) (quoting Foraker v. Chaffinch, 
501 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogated on other 
grounds by Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, ___ U.S. 
____,131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011)).  Specifically, the scope and 
content of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities is a question of 
fact, but the ultimate constitutional significance of those facts 
is a question of law.  Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 
1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2013).    
 
 When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must accept all 
facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 
2008).  The district court may not make findings of fact and, 
insofar as there is a factual dispute, the court may not resolve 
it.  See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 
654 F.3d 462, 469 n.9 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (Oct. 7, 
2011) (district court is not permitted to make independent 
findings of fact when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).  
Here, there was a factual dispute as to whether Flora’s job 
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duties encompassed making the statements at issue.9  Rather 
than accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the 
District Court in effect made factual determinations as to the 
scope of Flora’s duties.10  In doing so, it erred.  See Andrew v. 
                                              
 9 That such a dispute exists at this stage does not mean 
that one will, after discovery, remain for trial, and we do not 
imply that summary judgment will necessarily be 
inappropriate.  That is a question left for the District Court 
after development of the record. 
 
 10 For example, in his complaint, Flora makes the 
following allegations: that the funding issue had reached a 
“crisis stage” (App. at 39); that his duties included “managing 
the OPD: overseeing its lawyers and employees, establishing 
its policies, managing its budget, and ensuring its compliance 
with constitutional, statutory, and professional/ethical 
guidelines” (App. at 40); that he was statutorily obligated 
only to “provide representation to indigent criminal 
defendants where constitutionally mandated” (App. at 41); 
that he normally obtained funding by applying for grants  
(App. at 44) and petitioning the Commissioners (App. at 45-
48); that he “ha[d] done everything that he could do without 
additional resources to improve the functioning of the adult 
unit of the OPD and the services it provides to indigent 
defendants” before turning to extraordinary measures (App. at 
50); that he juxtaposed the lawsuit with “work[ing] within the 
County’s procedures to obtain proper funding and staffing for 
the OPD” (App. at 51); that Lawton was angry he had gone 
outside the chain of command in reporting the failure to 
complete the expungements (App. at 55); and that Flora 
believed that he was obligated as “an Officer of the Court” to 
report the issue (App. at 55).  Rather than accepting these 
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allegations as true, the District Court made independent 
findings as to disputed facts.  (See App. at 29 (“[T]he court 
finds that [Flora] pursuant to his duties as the Chief Public 
Defender, took these actions and, as such, was acting as a 
government employee, not a private citizen.”); App. at 28-29 
(“From the record before the court, there is no indication that 
[Flora] was acting as a citizen when he attempted to obtain 
additional funding for the OPD or took steps to remedy the 
failure of court administrative staff to expunge juvenile 
records as ordered by the court.  [Flora] was performing some 
of the very tasks for which he was hired ... .”); App. at 27 
(“As it is the public defender and not the average citizen that 
has the obligation to ensure that eligible criminal defendants 
are provided adequate legal representation ... , the plaintiff 
could not have filed the state court action in any other 
capacity than as that of the Chief Public Defender and clearly 
his actions in doing so related to his duties as the Chief Public 
Defender.”); App. at 28 (concluding that, because Flora 
alleged he learned of the failed expungements during a 
“routine” meeting, he was “‘routinely’ involved in overseeing 
the proper docketing of juvenile matters” and thus that 
“[Flora] was acting in his capacity as, and pursuant to his 
official duties as, the Chief Public Defender”); App. at 29 
(concluding that Flora’s actions were pursuant to his official 
duties because “[he] indicates in his motion for a preliminary 
injunction that the defendants had no legitimate interest ‘in 
preventing the Chief Public Defender [not Al Flora, Jr., as a 
citizen] from taking every lawful step necessary’”) (alteration 
in original); App. at 29 (“It is not the average citizen who 
would file a state court funding action in order to ensure that 
the OPD had adequate funding to provide indigent criminal 
defendants with adequate representation.”).)  
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Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 267 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he question 
whether [a memorandum] was written as part of [the 
plaintiff’s] official duties was a disputed issue of material fact 
that cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6).”).   
 
 B.  Citizen Speech  
 
 That error was compounded by the District Court’s 
application of an incorrect legal standard to the facts it had 
improperly found.  In determining whether Flora’s job duties 
encompassed the statements at issue, the District Court 
identified the relevant legal question as whether Flora’s filing 
the state court lawsuit and reporting the inadequate progress 
on expungements “related to” his job duties.  (App. at 25.)  
That approach misapprehends the question posed by Garcetti.  
 
 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Garcetti sets forth the 
controlling test for determining whether a public employee’s 
speech was made incident to his employment duties: “when 
public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate 
their communications from employer discipline.”  547 U.S. at 
421.  In Garcetti, a deputy district attorney wrote a 
dispositional memorandum, in which he recommended 
dismissing a prosecution based on an improper search warrant 
affidavit.  Id. at 414-15.  The district court concluded that, 
because the statements were made pursuant to his official job 
duties, they were not protected speech.  Id. at 415.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
holding that the speech was inherently a matter of public 
concern and that it did not unduly disrupt the operations of 
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the District Attorney’s Office.  Id. at 415-16.  The Supreme 
Court in turn reversed the court of appeals and held that 
courts must first inquire as to whether an employee spoke as a 
citizen or in his role as an employee.  Id. at 418.  The Court 
expressly recognized that “the First Amendment protects a 
public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as 
a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”  Id. at 417.  
The Court also stressed that, whether the speech at issue 
“concern[s] the subject matter of [the speaker’s] 
employment” is “nondispositive,” because the First 
Amendment “protects some expressions related to the 
speaker’s job.”  Id. at 421.  Instead, the “controlling factor” is 
whether the statements were “made pursuant to [the speaking 
employee’s] duties,” that is, whether such utterances were 
among the things that the employee “was employed to do.”  
Id. at 421.  The Garcetti Court did not advance a framework 
for defining when an employee speaks pursuant to his official 
duties.  Id. at 424.  It did, however, condemn reliance on 
“excessively broad job descriptions. ”  Id. at 424-25.  And, it 
cautioned against a focus on formal job descriptions because 
“[t]he proper inquiry is a practical one.”  Id. 
 
 We, too, have forgone any attempt to create a 
comprehensive framework for determining whether speech is 
made pursuant to an employee’s official job duties.  
Dougherty, 2014 WL 6600421, at *6.  We have, rather, 
attempted to “give[] contours to Garcetti’s practical inquiry.”  
Id.  (internal citations omitted).  For example, in Foraker v. 
Chaffich, we declined to extend First Amendment protection 
when the speech in question was directed “up the chain of 
command.”  501 F.3d at 241-43 (holding that police officers’ 
statements concerning hazardous conditions at a firing range 
were made pursuant to their official duties since they were 
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obligated to report that type of information up the chain of 
command), abrogated on other grounds by Guarnieri, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2488.  In Gorum v. Sessoms, we held that a professor 
who spoke on behalf of a student at a disciplinary hearing was 
speaking pursuant to his official duties when he was a “de 
facto” advisor to students on disciplinary matters.  561 F.3d at 
186. 
 
 The County and Lawton rely on our statement that a 
“claimant’s speech might be considered part of his official 
duties if it relates to ‘special knowledge’ or ‘experience’ 
acquired through his job,” Foraker, 501 F.3d at 240; accord 
Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185.  They contend that because the 
speech here relates to special knowledge Flora obtained as 
Chief Public Defender – in essence that it owes its existence 
to Flora’s job duties – it was not citizen speech.  (Appellees’ 
Br. at 15-16, 19.)  Foraker and Gorum, however, considered 
how the employee learned of the information as only one 
non-dispositive factor among many.  Indeed, 
 
[we have] never applied the “owes its existence 
to” test ... and for good reason: this nearly all-
inclusive standard would eviscerate citizen 
speech by public employees simply because 
they learned the information in the course of 
their employment, which is at odds with the 
delicate balancing and policy rationales 
underlying Garcetti. 
 
To this end, it bears emphasis that whether an 
employee’s speech “concern[s] the subject 
matter of [his] employment” is “nondispositive” 
under Garcetti. 547 U.S. at 421. This is because 
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the First Amendment necessarily “protects 
some expressions related to the speaker’s job.”  
Id.  In fact, as the Supreme Court recently 
reiterated, speech by public employees “holds 
special value precisely because those 
employees gain knowledge of matters of public 
concern through their employment.”  Lane, 134 
S. Ct. at 2379 (emphasis added) … .  
 
Dougherty, 2014 WL 6600421, at *7.   
 
 In Lane, the Supreme Court clarified that “[t]he critical 
question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself 
ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not 
whether it merely concerns those duties.”  134 S. Ct. at 2379 
(emphasis added).  The Court held that a public employee 
could not be terminated for providing to a grand jury truthful, 
sworn testimony under subpoena, even though the testimony 
concerned matters related to the employee’s job.  Id. at 2378-
79.  According to the Court, the term “official 
responsibilities,” means the responsibilities an employee 
undertook when he “went to work and performed the tasks he 
was paid to perform,” which did not, in that case, encompass 
testifying in legal proceedings.  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  And, the Court cautioned, there is “considerable 
value” in “encouraging, rather than inhibiting, speech by 
public employees.  For, [they] are often in the best position to 
know what ails the agencies for which they work.”  Id. at 
2377 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court therefore 
concluded that giving grand jury testimony was not part of 
that employee’s “ordinary job responsibilities” even though 
the testimony “relate[d] to [the employee’s] public 
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employment or concern[ed] information learned during that 
employment.”  Id. at 2378 (emphasis added). 
 
 Further, in Dougherty v. School District of 
Philadelphia, we had occasion to consider the implications of 
Lane for a School District employee who was terminated after 
saying to The Philadelphia Inquirer that the District 
Superintendent had improperly skirted competitive bidding 
rules and steered a lucrative contract to a personal 
acquaintance.  2014 WL 6600421 at *1.  We ruled that the 
employee spoke as a citizen rather than pursuant to his 
official duties, even though he oversaw the school district’s 
procurement program and learned of the alleged misconduct 
in that role.  Id. at *5-7.  We further decided that, because the 
employee’s “routine job responsibilities” did not include 
reporting misconduct to the press or to the school board, his 
speech was not within the scope of his employment “merely 
because the subject matter of the speech concern[ed] or 
relate[d] to those duties.”  Id. at *7, *9.  While it was not 
necessary to our conclusion, we noted that “Lane may 
broaden Garcetti’s holding by including ‘ordinary’ as a 
modifier to the scope of an employee’s job duties.”  Id. at *9.   
 
 Here, the District Court identified the relevant question 
as whether Flora’s actions “related to” his job duties.  (App. 
at 26.)  It then held that, because Flora’s statements did 
“relate[]” to his role as the Chief Public Defender, they were 
not citizen speech and were unprotected.  (App. at 26-29.)  In 
thus using the “related to” standard, the District Court did not 
apply the correct test under Garcetti, as Lane has made clear.  
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379  (“Garcetti said nothing about 
speech that simply relates to public employment or concerns 
information learned in the course of public employment.”).  
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In particular, the Supreme Court in Garcetti said that “[t]he 
First Amendment protects some expressions related to the 
speaker’s job.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).  
The decision to dismiss Flora’s complaint is thus at odds with 
controlling precedent.  While the District Court did not have 
the benefit of Lane and Dougherty when it ruled, Garcetti 
alone should have steered it away from applying the “related 
to” standard.  With the further light that Lane and Dougherty 
provide, the proper framing of the question is whether the 
filing of the state court funding suit and the reporting of the 
failure to finish the expungements were within Flora’s 
ordinary job duties as the Chief Public Defender, not whether 
they concerned or were related to those duties.  Lane, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2379.   
 
 Because the District Court’s decision rests on an errant 
reading of Garcetti and is at odds with Lane and Dougherty, 
it cannot stand.  We need not decide whether Lane modified 
or merely clarified Garcetti.11  Because Lane now controls, 
                                              
 11 Lane introduced the word “ordinary” to modify “job 
duties” in the First Amendment retaliation test.  Some courts 
have speculated whether this new adjective signals a shift in 
the law that broadens the scope of First Amendment 
protection for public employees.  See, e.g., Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 
F.3d 285, 295 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“In particular, the use of the 
adjective ordinary – which the court repeated nine times – 
could signal a narrowing of the realm of employee speech left 
unprotected by Garcetti.  Neither Garcetti nor any other 
previous Supreme Court case had added ordinary as a 
qualifier.”); Hagan v. City of New York, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 
No. 13-1108, 2014 WL 4058067, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 
2014) (“After Lane, the focus is on her ordinary job 
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cf. Perez v. Dana Corp., Parish Frame Div., 718 F.2d 581, 
584 (3d Cir. 1983) (“As a general rule an appellate court must 
apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.”), 
the responsibility of a district court in evaluating whether a 
public employee’s speech was made as a private citizen is to 
ask whether the speech at issue was “outside the scope of his 
ordinary job responsibilities.”  Id. at 2378.  
 
 C. Applying Lane to Flora’s Complaint  
 
 Against that legal backdrop, we consider the viability 
of Flora’s complaint.12  If the facts alleged are taken as true 
and construed in the light most favorable to Flora, the 
complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to plausibly 
establish that Flora’s statements were not made pursuant to 
                                                                                                     
responsibilities.”).  Flora argues that Lane merely clarified the 
Garcetti holding and does not represent any shift in the law.  
In Dougherty, we expressly declined to resolve that question 
because, on those facts, we did not need to do so.  2014 WL 
6600421 at *9.  Likewise, here, we do not need to decide 
whether Lane represents more than a clarification of existing 
law.   Due to the relief Flora is seeking, there is no qualified 
immunity determination to be made, so we can leave for 
another day the ramifications of deciding whether Lane 
constitutes new law.  
 
 12 Because this case presents a purely legal issue – the 
facts having to be accepted as alleged at the motion-to-
dismiss stage – we apply Lane in the first instance rather than 
remanding for the District Court to do so.  
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his ordinary job responsibilities.13  Flora’s complaint does 
concede some ground.  It includes allegations that, as the 
Chief Public Defender, he was responsible for his office’s 
representation of its clients and that he was terminated for 
enforcing those clients’ rights.  He also alleges that he learned 
about both the funding crisis and the expungement issue in 
the course of his job duties.  But Flora also alleges that, when 
channeling his speech “up the chain of command” failed to 
produce results, he took drastic measures by filing the 
funding lawsuit against the County and by reporting the 
unfinished expungements.14  Foraker, 501 F.3d at 237-38.  
                                              
 13 Again, Lawton and the County have not challenged 
that the statements touched on a matter of public concern or 
that the County lacked an adequate justification for treating 
Flora differently than other citizens, nor did they argue that 
the statements were not a substantial or motivating factor in 
prompting his discharge.  Thus, at this stage in the litigation, 
we need not address those issues.    
  
 14 While Flora’s institution of the funding lawsuit and 
reporting of the failure to finish the expungements may be 
construed as conduct, our precedent holds that verbal and 
written communications do not become conduct, rather than 
speech, merely because they happen to serve a certain 
function or serve as a vehicle for some other purpose.  King v. 
Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 225 (3d Cir. 2014); accord 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010).  
We are not asked to and we do not undertake to consider 
whether Flora’s lawsuit should be considered under the 
petition clause of the First Amendment.  Cf. Guarnieri, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2494 (public employee whose speech consists of 
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He further alleges that his obligations as an attorney, rather 
than as the Chief Public Defender, compelled him to make the 
statements at issue.  Finally, he describes both the funding 
crisis and the expungement issue as extraordinary 
circumstances impelling him to extraordinary speech.  
 
 A straightforward application of Lane leads us to 
conclude that, given those allegations, Flora’s speech with 
respect to both the funding litigation and the expungement 
problems was not part of his ordinary responsibilities – it was 
not part of the work he was paid to perform on an ordinary 
basis.  134 S. Ct. at 2378-79.   As claimed in his complaint, 
and as described in the statute creating the Public Defender, 
Flora’s ordinary job duties did not include the public 
reporting of lingering effects from government corruption or 
the filing of a class action suit to compel adequate funding for 
his office.  Rather, he represented indigent clients in criminal 
court and in related proceedings.  Lawton and the County 
contend that, because Flora alleges his speech was partially 
aimed at vindicating the rights of indigent criminal 
defendants, he has conceded that it was within the scope of 
his ordinary job duties.  But, their argument sweeps too 
broadly.  While certain statements in Flora’s complaint do 
suggest that the speech at issue bore some relation to his job 
duties and may have, indirectly, benefitted his clients, that 
does not bring the speech within the realm of his ordinary job 
duties.  Cf. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (teacher who reported 
funding deficiency was speaking as a citizen rather than as a 
teacher even though additional funding would have facilitated 
teacher’s education of students); Dougherty,  2014 WL 
                                                                                                     
instituting a lawsuit may bring retaliation claim either under 
speech or petition clause of First Amendment).  
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6600421 at *7, *9 (procurement director reporting 
superintendent’s failure to abide by procurement policies was 
speaking as citizen even though absence of wrongdoing 
would arguably facilitate procurement office operations).  To 
view it otherwise would unduly restrict First Amendment 
rights, because reporting malfeasance or misfeasance will 
regularly benefit an employee in the execution of his job 
duties by, presumably, removing impediments to proper 
government functioning.   
 
 Accordingly, we conclude that Flora’s complaint 
contains sufficient allegations that his ordinary job duties did 
not include filing the funding suit or reporting the 
expungement issue and the pleading should therefore have 
survived the motion to dismiss.  Whether Flora’s ordinary job 
duties actually encompassed such tasks is an issue that may 
need to be resolved later in the case.   
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will vacate the order of 
dismissal and remand for further proceedings.15  
                                              
 15  As the issue of remedy is not before us, we make no 
ruling regarding the propriety of the remedy that Flora seeks, 
but we note that care is in order in assessing it.  See, e.g., 
Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(noting that reinstatement may not be an available remedy if 
it requires bumping or displacing an innocent employee in 
favor of the plaintiff who would have held the job but for 
illegal discrimination); Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 173 & 
n.8 (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that reinstatement may not 
always be practical); Ray v. Iuka Special Mun. Separate Sch. 
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Dist., 51 F.3d 1246, 1254 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying reinstatement 
where there were no existing vacancies in school district and 
where reinstating plaintiff would require displacement of an 
existing employee). 
 
